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Abstract
Taking advantage of the passage of a microfinance law
in Italy (2014), we explore the rationales for introducing
microfinance-specific regulation in high-income wel-
fare states and the potential effects that this process may
have on MFIs’ social and financial performances (i.e.
double bottom line). Our findings suggest that the insti-
tutional transformation of MFIs, in addition to product
design and target group required by the new regulation,
has unintendedly shifted their balance in favor of finan-
cial over social performance. Thismainly applies to non-
profit organizations and cooperatives. Microfinance-
specific regulation in high-income welfare states may
reflect the emerging trends of market-based rational-
ity of public policy. When regulatory arrangements for
MFIs are stipulated irrespectively of MFIs’ original mis-
sion the structural causes of financial exclusion may be
reinforced. The underlying rationales for this trade-off
should be considered to prevent and mitigate the unin-
tended effects of microfinance-specific regulation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) supply small loans to people who are underserved by, or
excluded from, formal financial systems.Microfinance was historically conceived as a sustainable
policy tool to promote poverty alleviation (Olsen, 2017). However, a series of non-payment crises
worldwide, linked to the aggressive commercialization of the sector (Bastiaensen et al., 2013),
have put the ethical conduct of MFIs into question (Hudon & Sandberg, 2013). As a consequence,
many voices have argued for tighter,more effective regulatory policies able to address the so-called
microfinance ethical crisis (Lauer & Staschen, 2013).
Regulatingwhat is by nature an innovative financial approachmay presentmultiple challenges.
MFIs are part of the financial ecosystem and, thus, their regulation needs to be integrated into
existing legal frameworks andpolicy environments.Microfinance is highly context-specific (Anto-
nio Bittencourt Marconatto et al., 2013), and MFIs can adopt multiple institutional forms (e.g.
banks, cooperatives, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), government-owned organizations
providing microloans and non-profit organizations (NPOs)). These particularities of the microfi-
nance sector, paired with its evolution towards commercialization in the last decades, have broad-
ened the traditional definition of microfinance. In this regard, some microfinance products have,
for example, been designed using collaterals and guarantees. As such, MFIs are often subject to
different regulatory standards, operate according to diverse organizational cultures, and can be
non-profit or follow more commercial approaches (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). Therefore, no
consensus exists on whether the introduction of microfinance-specific laws that address, directly,
some or all of theMFIs’ operations is better than embeddingmicrofinance under existing financial
regulatory frameworks (Ledgerwood &White, 2006).
Western EuropeanMFIs are, compared to those operating in low-income countries, small-scale
and particularly socially oriented, and they operate mostly as NPOs or cooperatives (Blakenhol,
2015; Botti et al., 2017). These characteristicsmake themwell-suited to high-incomewelfare states,
where the theoretical potential of MFIs to support existing public services in tackling the struc-
tural and socially graded roots of financial exclusion has been discussed in the academic literature
(Barinaga, 2014). However, most Western European MFIs are challenged by legal vacua. Some
provide financial products by navigating the lack of specific financial rules and others adapt to
the mainstream ones, which the academic literature suggests may negatively affect their social
objectives (Cozarenco & Szafarz, 2018).
The rationales for introducing microfinance-specific regulation in low-income countries and
the potential effects that this process may have on MFIs’ social and financial performances (i.e.
double bottom line) have been substantially researched in the literature (Hermes & Hudon, 2018;
Olsen, 2017). However, these issues remain unexplored in high-income contexts such as the Euro-
pean Union (Cozarenco & Szafarz, 2019), whereMFIs have “emerged as one response to financial
exclusion in the modern welfare states” (McHugh et al., 2019, p. 80).
Our article aims to contribute to this gap in the literature by analyzing the perceptions of a
range of key stakeholders operating in the Italian microfinance sector where a sector-specific law
was enacted in 2014. We locate our study in Political Stakeholder Theory (PST) (Olsen, 2017). We
employ the constructs of double-bottom linemanagement andmission complexity in hybrid orga-
nizations (Battilana&Dorado, 2010; Grimes et al., 2020; Varendh-Mansson et al., 2020) to explore,
through qualitative interviews and documentary analysis, the “tensions, competing demands, and
ethical dilemmas” (Smith et al., 2013) that can arise when MFIs’ prospects of social and financial
achievements meet a unique stakeholder state-regulator (Olsen, 2017).
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We found that microfinance-specific regulation in Italy is intended to legitimize MFIs as win-
win vehicles for social inclusion and entrepreneurship. The regulatory mechanisms to achieve
this aim included capital adequacy for NPOs and cooperatives, product standardization, specifi-
cation of target groups, compulsory credit-plus services and interest rate ceilings. These mecha-
nisms have been designed to assure an effective balance between MFIs’ social and financial per-
formance. However, our findings also suggest that such regulatory mechanisms have unintended
consequences forMFIs. Abiding by the new regulation, especially in terms of product standardiza-
tion, specification of target groups and interest rate ceilings, requires an institutional transforma-
tion which may be detrimental to the social objectives of pre-regulation NPOs and cooperatives.
Our findings contribute to the literature on the effects of regulation on MFIs’ double bottom
line by highlighting that microfinance regulation in high-income welfare states may reflect the
emerging trends of market-based rationality for public service provision. This may represent a
challenge for Western European MFIs because they lack, compared to most MFIs operating in
low-income contexts, well institutionalized capacity building instruments to adapt to regulatory
tenets that promote a successful balance between financial and social performances. As such,
if regulatory arrangements for MFIs are stipulated irrespectively of MFIs’ original missions and
capacity, there is a risk that the structural causes of financial exclusion can be reinforced.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical background.
Section 3 introduces the Italian microfinance sector and describes, in detail, its sector-specific
regulation. Section 4 describes our methods and analysis. Section 5 presents our findings, which
are critically discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
MFIs attempt to pursue a complex mission by operating, ideally, through three principles: (1) fair
interest rates, (2) balance between efficiency and lending to the poor, and (3) protection of poor
people from over-indebtedness (Hudon, 2011; Hudon &Ashta, 2013). For this reason, MFIs can be
broadly defined as hybrid models of financial inclusion with a double-bottom line—that is, they
attempt to combine social and financial objectives in one mission (Battilana & Dorado, 2010).
To pursue their mission, hybrid organizations must generally negotiate their operations with
different stakeholders, because they need different audienceswilling to support theirmultiple and
diverse goals (Battilana et al., 2014). These negotiations, often underpinned by divergent values,
can be productive for hybrid organizations such as MFIs, providing themwith legitimacy to com-
promise between different objectives and, thus, integrate them successfully into a whole mission
(Varendh-Mansson et al., 2020). However, albeit intentional, these negotiations may lead to unex-
pected results (Grimes et al., 2020). The literature suggests that organizations might depart (or be
perceived to depart) from their mission (i.e. mission drift) when actions are taken to cater to or
deviate from specific negotiation terms. This is especially the casewhen these negotiations involve
institutional actors or mechanisms that are exogenous to the organizational setting (Grimes et al.,
2020). For example, scholars suggest that MFIs may choose to target wealthier clients to cope
with the uncertainty caused by volatile subsidization (D’Espallier et al., 2017) or to charge higher
interest rates to remunerate their shareholders, thus drifting from their mission-related principles
(Hudon et al., 2018).
Among several exogenous factors that can affectwhetherMFIs can balance their double bottom
line and adhere to their complex mission, regulation has been recognized as a particularly crucial
one (Hermes & Hudon, 2018). In contexts of lack of specific microfinance regulation, some MFIs
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have been found to increase their profits at the expense of customer protection (Chen et al., 2010).
Driven by uncontrolled competition and need for private investments, particularMFIs worldwide
have used exploitative practices, contributed to the overindebtedness of borrowers and fuelled
non-payment crises (Ashta & Hudon, 2012; Bastiaensen et al., 2013). For this reason, scholars and
policy makers have argued that microfinance has lost its moral compass and its potential to be
profitable while serving a social mission (Beisland et al., 2017; D’Espallier et al., 2013; Hulme &
Maitrot, 2014). As such,microfinance-specific regulationhas been promoted as ameans to support
MFIs with their double bottom line management and the fulfilment of their complex mission
(Lauer & Staschen, 2013).
Experiences of microfinance regulation worldwide are diverse, but the literature divides them
between prudential and non-prudential (McNew, 2009). Prudential regulation involves central-
ized supervision and introduces norms of capital adequacy and liquidity compliance for MFIs.
This type of regulation has been advocated for situations in whichMFIs may create systemic risks
and market distortions. In this case, regulation is mainly justified by market imperfections and
is particularly envisaged for MFIs that collect deposits from the public (Arun, 2005; Cull et al.,
2011). In contrast to stringent prudential practices, non-prudential regulation is “concerned with
transparency, disclosure, control of ownership, consumer protection, fees, rates and financial per-
formance” (Jobim, 2012, p. 12). Such measures are usually self-implemented, not supervised by
financial authorities and intended to prevent potential misconduct while preserving the institu-
tional differences and innovation in the sector (Keyes, 2006).
Despite its protective aims, microfinance-specific regulation is a context-responsive process
(Macchiavello, 2017). PST posits that governments can impose specific political wills over MFIs,
and they do this by controlling, through microfinance-specific rules, the breadth and depth of
negotiations that MFIs can carry out with other sector stakeholders (Olsen, 2017). Depending on
the level of involvement that a state aims to have in the microfinance sector, regulation can influ-
ence the type of legitimacyMFIs can pursue and, as a consequence, whether the actions needed to
pursue such legitimacy cater to or drift from their original mission (Olsen, 2017). For this reason,
microfinance-specific regulation frequently comes with trade-offs for MFIs (Dato et al., 2020).
Empirical studies on the effects of regulation on microfinance have focused mostly on low-
income countries, and have examined the regulation effects against MFIs’ indicators of social and
financial performance (i.e. breadth and depth of outreach, percentage of female borrowers, aver-
age loan balance size/GNI per capita, operational self-sustainability, financial self-sustainability,
return on assets and equity, among others). Regulation has been considered a potential indirect
instrument to boost the sustainability and efficiency of the microfinance sector, enabling MFIs to
collect savings from the public and increase the numbers of clients reached (Hartarska & Nadol-
nyak, 2007). Regulation can also lead to MFIs cutting their operating expenses and lowering their
interest rates (D’Espallier et al., 2017). However, expanding the banking functions ofMFIs through
regulation has also been argued to undermine their social orientation towards more financially-
excluded and worse-off clients. A positive association has been found between regulation and
MFIs’ inability to pursue their original organizational objectives—that is, mission drift (Cull et
al., 2011; D’Espallier et al., 2017; Mia & Lee, 2017).
However, evidence is mixed and there is a body of work suggesting that regulation does not
affect MFIs’ performance. Exploring regulation effects onMFIs’ sustainability and outreach, Har-
tarska (2009) found that the social and financial indicators of 108MFIsworldwide did not improve
when specific regulatory frameworks were in place. Mersland and Strøm (2009) corroborate that
no causal links exist between regulation and the social and financial performance of MFIs. Other
scholars, mostly through qualitative analysis, have argued that regulationmight have detrimental
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effects onMFIs’ efficiency, sustainability and outreach in Ghana (Anku-Tsede, 2014), Nigeria and
Zambia (Okoye&Siwale, 2017; Siwale&Okoye, 2017). Similarly, the evidence on the effects of non-
prudential regulatory mechanisms on microfinance suggests that specific regulatory frameworks
can control market penetration and competition, and ultimately damage MFIs’ social outreach
(Afonso et al., 2017).
In Western Europe, well-developed mainstream financial systems have led to most govern-
ments leaving microfinance unregulated (EMN, 2020). Whilst some authors argue that specific
regulation would improve the financial viability of the sector (Pedrini et al., 2016) and enhance
financial inclusion (Estapé-Dubreuil & Torreguitart-Mirada, 2013), others question the effects of
specialized laws on the social performance of MFIs (Dayson & Vik, 2014). Cozarenco and Szafarz
(2018) quantitatively explore how the impact of a regulatory change affects the social performance
of a FrenchMFI. In this case, the introduction of a loan ceiling forMFIs triggers mechanisms that
contribute to female credit rationing. The authors argue that post-regulation co-funding schemes
betweenMFIs and commercial banks are detrimental for women asMFIs embed banks’ screening
biases.
The rationales for regulating MFIs in high-income welfare states and the potential effects
of microfinance-specific regulation on MFIs’ double-bottom line management remain there-
fore open to debate. Our paper explores these issues in the Italian microfinance sector where
a microfinance-specific law was recently approved.
3 MICROFINANCE-SPECIFIC REGULATION: ITALY
Themicrofinance sector in Italy has experienced rapid growth between 2005 and 2014, with nearly
300 non-profit-led initiatives at a national level in 2014 (ENM, 2014). In the same year, the Italian
Government enacted a newmicrocredit-specific legislation (Decree no. 176/2014) that introduced
two fundamental changes in the sector: (a) a new legal entity forMFIs calledmicrocredit operator
(MO) and (b) a distinction between entrepreneurial and social microcredit.
The introduction of MOs, the new legal form of MFI operating under article no. 111 of the Ital-
ian Consolidated Banking Act, has strong implications for the NPOs engaged in microfinance
activities before regulation. The law makes a distinction between entrepreneurial microcredit,
defined as microloans of up to €25,000 (€35,000 in specific cases) for microentrepreneurs, and
social microcredit which are personal loans with no collateral requirements of up to €10,000.
NPOs that decide not to transform into MOs are restricted to exclusively disbursing social micro-
credit at a capped interest rate, in theory calculated to cover their operational expenses and costs
of the legally required credit-plus services. Pre-regulation NPOs that aim to continue disbursing
both entrepreneurial and social microcredit will have to do so in the form of MOs. This institu-
tional transformation, as shown in Table 1, implies new requirements in terms of capital adequacy,
legal status (e.g. public limited company, private limited company, cooperative limited-liability
company), products offered (activity restricted to microcredit only and at least 51% of the portfo-
lio should be entrepreneurial microloans), services offered (two compulsory credit-plus services
required), governance, target groups and interest rate limits (MEF, 2014).
This regulatory process of microcredit was completed with the subsequent enactment, in 2015,
of another financial intermediation law (Statutory provision no. 288/2015; Decree no. 53/2015) to
regulate the operations of NBFIs, also known as financial intermediaries. These were included
under the prudential supervision of the Bank of Italy under article no. 106 of the Italian Con-
solidated Banking Act (Bank of Italy, 2015; MEF, 2015). Prior to this regulatory intervention, the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 E. Bellazzecca and O. Biosca
supervision exercised by Bank of Italy on NBFIs was graded on the basis of their operational size.
Whilst larger intermediarieswere registered on a special list and subject to prudential supervision,
smaller socially-oriented NBFIs were non-prudentially regulated.
After the changes in the law in 2014 and 2015, smaller NBFIs, especially those highly active in
the microcredit sector, had to decide between transforming into MOs or into prudentially regu-
lated NBFIs. The latter choice entailed complying with requirements on capital adequacy, own-
ership structures, and exit strategies, among others. The legal form, products, target beneficiaries
and legal requirements for MOs, NPOs and NBFIs are described in detail in Table 1.
To accessMicrocredit Guarantees Schemes, banks andNBFIs are required to complywith prod-
uct and target requirements that are equivalent to those of MOs. These schemes, implemented
within the context ofmainstreamGuarantees Schemes (Leone& Porretta, 2014), are public instru-
ments to support micro, small and medium enterprises access credit. They provide insurance to
MOs, NBFIs and banks against default risks of microentrepreneurs by covering up to 80% of the
defaulted microloan.
4 METHODS AND ANALYSIS
Our case-study is focused on theEmilia Romagna region inNorth Italy, which represents an exem-
plary case of Italian microfinance for its relatively high number of microcredit initiatives and
small-scale microloans disbursed by both commercial banks and other types of MFIs (Brunori
et al., 2014; ENM, 2014).
A sample of eight individuals, including representatives of the leadingMFIs operating in Emilia
Romagna region, policy-makers at national level who voted for the approval of the law and one
expert in the sector, was purposefully selected as a primary data source using maximum variation
sampling (Patton, 2014). Participants were recruited through email and phone calls; their con-
tact details were retrieved through institutional websites. We attempted to capture institutional
variation in the type of stakeholder (including legal forms of MFIs potentially impacted by new
regulation, and type of services offered by MFIs when applicable), role in the microcredit regula-
tion process and years of involvement in microcredit activities in Italy.
Semi-structured interviews (n= 8)with open-ended questions tailored to the type of respondent
(four topic guides were used) were undertaken in Italian either face-to-face in the stakeholders’
premises (n = 3) or through Skype (n = 5) between June and October 2016. The interviews cov-
ered the following topics: (1) MFIs’ mission and products; (2) target market; (3) factors relevant
to MFIs’ financial and social sustainability including geographical scope, governance structure,
regulatory status, subsidies, characteristics of active borrowers and screening processes; (4) the
new microfinance-specific regulatory framework and its relationship with each of the previous
topics. Interviews ranged in length from 34 to 96 minutes. All interviews were digitally recorded
and transcribed in full. The analysis was conducted in Italian and, subsequently, quotes from par-
ticipants were translated into English.
Our sampling-for-meaning approach, based on institutional variation, and the use of extant evi-
dence for data sense-making allowed for meaningful, although non-generalizable results (Boddy,
2016). More precisely, our sample includes the views of the major microfinance-specialized orga-
nizations in Italy (i.e. Per Micro—largest microcredit portfolio), especially in Emilia Romagna
region, as well as the views of key representatives of the most popular typologies of microfinance
providers in Italy: cooperative banks, NBFIs and cooperatives. This, coupled with the views of
representatives of the state regulator and of an expert, allowed us to capture enough institutional
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variation to explore the underlying rationales for microfinance-specific regulation and the per-
ceived consequences of the new legal requirements on MFIs’ financial and social performance.
Secondary data collection was also undertaken to retrieve legislation and reports on institu-
tional characteristics, internal performance, operations and policies of the sampled MFIs, as well
as to contextualize our qualitative interviews. Table 2 shows our sampled MFIs and stakehold-
ers’ affiliation, secondary data, and the rationale for sample selection. Ethical approval for this
study was obtained from the Glasgow School for Business and Society Research Ethics Commit-
tee, Glasgow Caledonian University. All research participants gave full written consent.
Primary and secondary data were analyzed following the principles of abductive thematic anal-
ysis (Rambaree & Faxelid, 2013)—that is, mixing deductive and inductive reasoning. Practically,
we processed our analysis as follows. In a first stage, we used structural coding (Vaismoradi et al.,
2013) to group data-driven, descriptive essential codes applied to portions of textual evidence from
the interview transcripts and secondary data. Through this strategy we identified, deductively,
first-order themes based on the topics covered during our interviews. In this stage of analysis
we categorized the insights from respondents and documentary evidence and grouped them into
theoretical themes relevant to MFIs’ double bottom line management, including regulation. For
example,we identified “institutional transformation” as a first-order theme. Institutional transfor-
mation ofMFIs is theoretically supported by the literature as amechanism explaining the impacts
that the regulation can have on MFIs’ double bottom line (Hermes & Hudon, 2018). In our data,
this theme is supported by open codes such as, for instance, “organizational form”, “business
model”, “legal status”, “external supervision”, and accounts for the institutional changes MFIs
implemented to respond to the regulatory changes in the Italian microfinance sector.
In a second analytical stage, we applied causation coding (Saldana, 2015) to further explore
the content of each first-order theme and infer, inductively, whether respondents perceived any
causal connections between specific elements ofMFIs’ double bottom line and the introduction of
the new regulatory framework. By searching for causal linguistic expressions such as “because”,
“therefore”, “since”, “if it wasn’t for”, “as a result of”, “the reason is”, etc. (Saldana, 2015, p. 163), we
explored the rationales for a microfinance-specific regulation and the relating perceived changes
and effects onMFIs’ operations that respondents attributed to the introduction of the newmicrofi-
nance law. For example, when exploring the perceived causal link between the newmicrofinance
regulation and the theme “institutional transformation”, we identified that changes inMFIs’ busi-
ness model as a response to the new law could lead to two scenarios, depending on the type of
stakeholders interviewed. On the one hand, these changes encouraged by the new law were envi-
sioned by policy makers as a necessary step towards a more efficient and socially oriented micro-
finance sector. On the other, the institutional changes required by the law were not part of the
life-cycle plans of the MFIs interviewed, and thus they were perceived as adding complexity to
their double bottom line management and creating tension in their dual mission.
Finally, to account for the emerging thematic split between policy makers’ and practitioners’
perceptions of the rationales for regulating microfinance and the associated effects onMFIs’ dou-
ble bottom line, we created two higher-level grouping codes. The first grouping code collates the
views ofmicrofinance stakeholders that are external toMFIs (i.e. policymakers and expert). Their
perspectives were broader and abstract, at a more national level, as they were not affected by day-
to-day management of a MFI. The second code accounts for the diverse perceptions coming from
institutionally differentMFIs (NPO/cooperative, NBFIs and a bank) and the reasoning behind the
strategic decisions made by MFIs to manage a double bottom line in the context of the new legal
requests. Our findings are presented below and reflect, thematically, this institutional split.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 E. Bellazzecca and O. Biosca
Our analytical approach led us to saturate our data because our emerging theoretical expla-
nations made sense when located in extant literature (Bowen, 2008). We conducted our analysis
using QSR International’s NVivo 10 Software for qualitative research (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013).
5 FINDINGS
5.1 The intended effects of regulation: MFIs as win-win vehicles for
inclusion and entrepreneurship
In the views of the policy makers and the expert, the pre-regulation microfinance sector was inef-
fective, especially due to the poor balance between social and financial performances of theMFIs,
including banks. Regulation was described as desirable to strengthen the sector and contribute to
preserve its social mission as, in their view, larger financial institutions such as banks should have
played a more responsible role. This issue was attributed to the absence of a proper formal defi-
nition and operationalization of microcredit, but it was also linked to the increasing presence of
banks in the Italian microcredit sector over the decade before the new law was enacted in 2014
(ENM, 2014).
In the view of our respondents, the pre-regulation microfinance sector was not formulated as
a social policy tool and this was perceived to have affected the sector’s social performance, espe-
cially in terms of depth of outreach. For example, banks involved inmicrocredit operations before
regulation were perceived as simple “money dispensers”. They used personal characteristics of
clients to apply market segmentation and increase their supply of new and profitable financial
products that still excluded underserved individuals. These practices were regarded as potential
barriers for microcredit to become a real financial inclusion mechanism and were also seen as
enablers of the exploitative conduct of sub-prime lenders in the country:
Small loans are those in which loan sharks can intervene more easily by applying
usury interest rates to desperate people, who are desperate just for small loans that
they cannot repay (Politician 2).
In this context, the new law emerged as important to prevent financial and social exclusion.
More specifically, the requirements forMOs (i.e. loan ceilings, interest rate caps, capital adequacy,
product design and product delivery) were designed to strengthen the social mission of the sec-
tor by encouraging MFIs to become more socially oriented, whilst preserving their financial sus-
tainability. Therefore, regulation was necessary to make microfinance an effective instrument to
tackle exclusion through employment:
Microfinance is not only aimed at income support or, even worse, at replacing
an income that is not in place. It should incentivize and support forms of self-
employment. As with all sectors, even with microcredit it is necessary to invest in
knowledge and research tomake these institutions (MFIs) not only minor ATMs, but
also actors that orient and support sustainable development projects (Politician 1).
The new law introduced four requirements designed to change the way in which MFIs were
operating. Firstly, loan ceilings were devised to enhance the depth of outreach of the sector by
encouraging MFIs to focus only on vulnerable microborrowers looking for small loans for pri-
Intended and unintended effects of specialized regulation 13
mary needs. Secondly, alongside the 2014 law, Microcredit Guarantees Schemes were extended by
the Italian Government to all newMOs, NBFIs and banks. Respondents argued that public inter-
vention provided an indirect pathway to help larger financial institutions such as banks achieve
their social aspirations and reach more vulnerable consumers. Thirdly, capital adequacy require-
ments imposed by the law on MOs were seen as a way to promote the financial viability of MFIs,
improve their products quality and capacity to serve and assist microentrepreneurs, as well as
to protect their borrowers. Finally, the requirement of providing non-financial services to micro-
credit borrowers, particularly for business loans, had been introduced to help borrowers increase
the return from their investments, and also create and preserve a direct relationship between the
MFIs and their clients, which in turn would allow for better and responsible screening as well as
for improving clients’ financial behavior:
According to 2014 data from the National Authority of Microcredit [Ente Nazionale
per ilMicrocredito], what is called accompaniment [credit-plus services] only reflects
in the screening process [. . . ] Offering technical and personal training courses is also
important because the businesses must survive and be competitive [. . . ] This would
ensure repayment but also the good evolution of the businesses.We talk about utopia,
I know, but the legislation speaks of accompaniment [credit-plus services] in these
terms (Expert).
However, the effects of the operational changes required by the new legislation were uncertain.
Some of these institutional changes could also represent potential drivers of mission-drift among
MFIs, especially among thosewith large loan portfolios and striving for particularly good financial
performances:
I don’t know what the reaction of the overall sector will be. The need for [economic]
sustainability could prevail over themission [. . . ] I cannot figure outwhatwill remain
of the experiences we have (Expert).
5.2 Microfinance-specific regulation: A case for MFIs’ mission drift
The legislation was considered fragmented and incomplete by sector professionals in that, from
a practical and operational perspective, the new legal framework was perceived as not been
designed to accommodate the challenges that MFIs face when operating in specific contexts. The
tensions between a more high-level, national perspective, and a more localized and practical one
were clear from our results. For example, the interviewed practitioners felt that the legislation
had not accounted for the degree of innovation that characterized the sustainability of the micro-
finance model in Emilia Romagna before the new law was enacted. Respondents clarified that,
prior to the regulatory changes, Emilia Romagna was characterized by socially innovative part-
nerships that involved banks, socially oriented NBFIs and NPOs working together to implement
and sustain both entrepreneurial and social microcredit programs. Inwords of one of our intervie-
wees: “An issue with this regulation is that it assumes that MFIs are entities that directly provide
microcredit, regardless of what they really are” (Emil Banca 1).
After the new microfinance law was implemented, some of these partnerships had to be inter-
rupted. Respondents expressed concerns around their ability to manage the double-bottom line
of their MFIs during and after the transformation required to comply with the law, given that
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they had to give up some of these partnerships, fundamental to the success of their operations.
The risk of mission drift emerged as the main concern for MFIs in terms of product development,
outreach, legal structure, and financial sustainability.
The first issue raised by our respondents was that, contrarily to the regulators’ view, specialized
MOs cannot be considered as stand-alone economic actors, able to efficientlymanage their double
bottom line. MFIs were deemed effective when operating in collaborative business environments,
where screening and monitoring of clients, credit disbursement and provision of extra-credit ser-
vices were shared among multiple actors operating in different capacities. This contributed to
limit the risks of microlending and ensured the sustainability of the whole microfinance supply
chain.
Uncertainty was also expressed around the ability of newly regulated MOs to balance their
dual mission, especially when operating independently. For instance, adapting entrepreneurial
microcredit products to the new law required the compulsory supply of high-quality credit-plus
services. This requirement, which seemed necessary from a policy perspective to guarantee client
protection and business sustainability, represented a barrier for organizations transforming into
MOs, which would focus much of their efforts on designing sustainable entrepreneurial products
at the expense of social microcredit design and provision:
We fulfilled all the legal requirements [. . . ] but things came backwith further requests
[from the regulator] in relation to ordinary activities, which are entrepreneurial
loans. We had to focus on this. So, now I know very well what is required for this
[entrepreneurial microcredit], but we had to put credit for social inclusion aside
(Mag6).
Concerns with this requirement emerged strongly from the data as it seemed to affect all types
of microcredit providers. It also affected banks that had been operating as MFIs:
We do not do additional services, we do not do tutoring services because they are very
far from what the reality of a bank is, at least in the Italian banking model. And we
don’t do them because it’s basically impossible to get paid for them (Emil Banca 2).
There were other reasons for which the practitioners interviewedwere worried that they would
not be able to keep up their supply of social microcredit products to pre-regulation levels and
preserve their depth of outreach. For example, the new microcredit law requires MOs to mainly
focus on financial products for microentrepreneurs (51%minimum of the total loan portfolio). All
the practitioners interviewed highlighted the importance that social microcredit programs had
in the Emilia Romagna context, where specific social needs (e.g. supporting women economic
independence or informal economic groups) emerged to be addressable only through forms of
non-entrepreneurial financial inclusion. They questioned the balance required by the 2014 law
between the two forms of credit:
It [regulation] proposes a British formulation of microcredit that sees the importance
of entrepreneurial microcredit over social microcredit, and therefore substantially
extraneous from the Italian context, where microfinance institutions operate mainly
through this social tool, and less through entrepreneurial microcredit (Emil Banca 1).
Intended and unintended effects of specialized regulation 15
A barrier for MFIs to continue operating as social policy implementers, mainly in partner-
ship with local authorities, was the requirement to target microcredit services only at population
groups with specific demographic and socio-economic characteristics defined by the law. This
requirement, introduced to ensure that microcredit focused on social groups in need, constrained
MFIs to serving specific groups (unemployed, pre-defined income bracket, etc.) which implied
that some of the traditional clients of social microcredit could no longer be served. The social and
mutual aid products that were most affected were those that covered emergencies of vulnerable
groups such as the “working-poor” or gender-violence victims, for example. Unforeseen expendi-
ture shocks of microborrowers, such as broken-down cars or dental emergencies, had been tradi-
tionally funded through social microcredit products, but after regulation some vulnerable popu-
lation groups had been left out of the population categories that MOs could target. This emerged
particularly restrictive for organizations that were operating as mutual cooperatives (i.e. Mag6).
Changes in the law imposed requirements for cooperative membership (also clients) which, as a
result, needed to fit a particular socio-economic category. For cooperatives, this requirement not
only had ownership and governance implications but, importantly, it limited the organizations’
ability to diversify risks, cross-subsidize their activities, and pursue their social and financial goals.
Social microcredit for personal consumption was considered as a substantially less risky finan-
cial product, when compared to entrepreneurial microcredit. Practitioners claimed that it was
difficult for them to assess the risk that business microcredit entailed (i.e. if businesses’ liquid-
ity problems were transitory or if they were due to the viability of the business model), and they
underlined the importance of having the capacity and know-how to screen each operation very
carefully. Intervieweesmentioned that their organizations had traditionally cross-subsidized their
lending operations towards microentrepreneurs using ‘pre-regulation’ social microcredit, consid-
ered as potentially profitable. Imposing a ratio between the volumes of social and entrepreneurial
microcredit (at least 51% of the loan portfolio) was described as problematic and damaging for
the operational sustainability of MFIs: “It is hard to balance this mix [social and entrepreneurial
microcredit]” (Emil Banca 2). Furthermore, capping the interest rates on social microcredit prod-
ucts was perceived as a regulatory adjustment that would hamper the balance between MFIs’
social and financial performances, because the supply of services to individuals in need of liquid-
ity for personal purposes could be restricted: “The interest rate cap on private citizens’ microloans
implies that it is impossible to offer them in a financially sustainable way” (PerMicro).
Our secondary data analysis corroborates the insights from the interviews and suggests that
even financially sustainable organizations such as banks may encounter difficulties in manag-
ing the costs of entrepreneurial microcredit and credit-plus services if specific subsidies were not
in place. For instance, by looking at loan ceilings applied by Emil Banca (Table 3), microcredit
under €25,000 is disbursed to entrepreneurs alongside credit-plus services only when the guar-
antees from the central government are available. More importantly, the combined restrictions
described by respondents limited the ability of MFIs to continue innovating and exploring new
services that would contribute to higher social impact but also increase profits to cross-subsidize
other activities. In terms ofmicrocredit services, practitioners gave examples of what they thought
had been successful products that would no longer be feasible under the new microfinance regu-
lation. For example, microcredit services to restructure debts of employees of large private com-
panies (corporate welfare) or for entrepreneurs in specific disaster-hit areas in Italy with loan
sizes slightly over the limit imposed by newmicrofinance regulation (€25,000) (see Table 3). Also,
the more basic supply of microfinance products such as bank accounts for microborrowers and
insurance products in collaboration with other financial institutions was at risk.
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Such concerns around restrictions thatwould compromise the sustainability of newly regulated
MOs were weighted by respondents against the perceived advantages of becoming prudentially-
regulated as NBFI instead. This strategy emerged as optimal to continue operating in the micro-
credit sector in more flexible terms:
Our choice [to be a NBFI] is evident, because the new legislation imposes a series
of limitations [. . . ] The register of MOs has remained empty until recently. Perhaps
many microcredit institutions have been a bit discouraged by this new legislation
(CxIT).
However, being regulated asNBFI also presented risks as it would requireMFIs to focus on their
financial performance, including reporting requirements for supervision purposes, with potential
negative consequences for depth of outreach:
If we talk about MOs [. . . ], in my opinion there is no sustainability. There is no way.
If we talk about NBFIs, I think we’ll see. (PerMicro).
Nonetheless, secondary data analysis suggests that depth of outreach issues, especially for
NBFIs, could be moderated by the Government Microcredit Guarantees Scheme. The findings
on these are twofold depending on the type of MFI disbursing the loans. Firstly, the Guarantees
Scheme may encourage financial institutions such as NBFIs and banks to focus on their social
objectives through collaborative partnerships with third-sector organizations, resulting in lower
sums of credit being offered and enhancing depth of outreach (see Table 3). Secondly, although
the Microcredit Guarantees Scheme may encourage a NBFI to risk more by securing for free the
bank’s loans to entrepreneurs (CxIT), NBFI-Bank partnerships may have been used in the past to
finance larger business projects, with higher sums of credit in specific disaster-hit areas (Table 3).
In summary, the new legal framework formicrofinance was perceived as threatening the finan-
cial and, consequently, social performance of the sector from the perspective of all MFIs inter-
viewed.
6 DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that the Italian microfinance regulation has impacted the way in which
some Italian MFIs manage the tension between their social and financial objectives. Such ten-
sion emerges reinforced by the newly introduced regulation that impacted NPOs and coopera-
tives already struggling to balance their double-bottom line before the regulatory changes. More
precisely, the new legislation required a process of institutional transformation for most microfi-
nance providers operating in the Italian sector. Pre-regulation NPOs with microcredit and related
services as their main activity faced the choice of either transforming into MOs or, prudentially
regulated and supervised, NBFIs. These transformation processes not only required important
changes in the nature and business models of pre-regulation MFIs, but also contributed to the
dismantling of those systems of partnerships and alliances that had enabled MFIs to flourish by
balancing their financial and social objectives successfully. In particular, the benefits of these part-
nerships emerged from our findings as effective strategies for MFIs to identify needs, perform fair
screening and assist microentrepreneurs through NPOs particularly focused on tackling systemic
inequalities.
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These findings are aligned with the scholarly research onmicrofinance regulation andmission
complexity in hybrid organizations. Regulation, in the form of loan ceilings, has been argued to
have unintended detrimental consequences on the social performance of the sector (Cozarenco
& Szafarz, 2018; Siwale & Okoye, 2017). Similarly, the academic literature onMFI transformations
and microfinance commercialization worldwide suggests that these events are frequently associ-
ated with substantial increases in the average loan size supplied by MFIs, the preferred indica-
tor for mission drift (D’Espallier et al., 2017). Finally, the state regulator has the power to affect
the productive tensions that MFIs need to achieve their complex mission by establishing who the
other sector stakeholders are and the types of transactions they are allowed to carry out with them
(Olsen, 2017; Varendh-Mansson et al., 2020). In the case of regulated standardization of MFI pro-
grams, the productive tensions needed for innovation in microfinance might be at risk (Keyes,
2006).
Our article suggests that the Italian microfinance legislation was designed and enacted to stan-
dardizemicrofinance activities and institutions and, by ensuring adequate financial performance,
to strengthen the overall social mission of the sector. Control and supervision of microfinance
activities were designed to enhance ethical behavior and consumer protection in the sector as a
whole, including not onlyMFIs but alsomainstream banks, public organizations and other finan-
cial intermediaries. However, whilst regulators and policymakers were aiming for a “virtuous”
microcredit sector, the practitioners interviewed experienced operational difficulties. They found
challenging to fulfill their double mission under the new legal requirements and questioned the
economic viability of the model proposed by the regulators.
The ethical principles underlying the new legal framework were considered unquestionable
and shared by all the stakeholders interviewed. However, their operationalization posed chal-
lenges to MFIs, especially when carried out in a particular context at a local level. In practice, the
main challenges were the required changes of institutional form, capital adequacy, differentiation
between entrepreneurial and social microloans, restrictions in the balance of entrepreneurial and
social loans in the portfolio, loan ceilings, interest rate caps, compulsory credit-plus services, and
a carefully stipulated group of target clients, among others. The standardization and restrictions
imposed by the law had limited the ability of MFIs to take advantage of local opportunities. This
suggests that the ethical norms underpinning Italian microcredit-specific regulation may have
not been translated into appropriate rules and laws to allow for MFIs balancing their efficiency
and lending to the poor.
Furthermore, adapting to these legal requirements had compromisedMFIs’ double bottom line
management. More precisely, the organizations’ depth of outreach was challenged because social
products/programs that MFIs used to offer before the new law did not comply with new regula-
tory restrictions and had to bemodified or abandoned. This supports the argument that regulation
can hinder social performance, particularly by restricting target groups of users and increasing the
lenders’ costs (Hermes & Hudon, 2018). Reductions in the depth of outreach have been found in
the literature to increase the incidence of trade-offs between the financial and social aims of MFIs
(Hudon et al., 2018). For instance, this emerged relevant for Italian MOs’ mission, since micro-
credit regulation impeded both cross-subsidization of products and strategic partnerships crucial
for the survival of MFIs’ social loans. Furthermore, the MFIs in our sample striving for financial
sustainability were uncertain whether they could achieve this under the newly introduced insti-
tutional form,MO, and became regulated and supervised NBFIs instead. This could be the under-
lying reasoning behind the limited number of MFIs that transformed into MOs at a national level
after regulation was enacted. According to PLTV Protection and Lending (2017), only 11 had MO
20 E. Bellazzecca and O. Biosca
status in May 2017 and were still waiting for a formal inclusion into a publicly-available national
list of specialized MOs.
Finally, our study also suggests that the role of the new regulation in the context of the Govern-
ment Guarantee Schemes can also be crucial, because the screening processes of clients before
regulation could be initiated by banks’ partners with clear social orientation: (1) pre-regulation
NPOs (no longer permitted by the new law to supply this service using government schemes
if not regulated) and (2) pre-regulation NBFIs, which were not constrained in their risk man-
agement strategies. This suggests that, after regulation, vulnerable entrepreneurs might only be
able to access low-cost microcredit if microcredit guarantees will cover their default risks, directly
assessed by banks and NBFIs, which are required to expose more of their assets to serve them.
Our article offers new theoretical insights into the complex relationship between the state reg-
ulator andMFIs. The reasons for high-income welfare states to introduce a microfinance-specific
regulation may subtly lay in the emerging market-based rationality for delivering public services,
at least in specific political contexts. More precisely, a microfinance-specific regulation in high-
income welfare states may come with coercive legitimacy for MFIs (Olsen, 2017). This applies
especially to NPOs and cooperatives, in that these organizations are called upon solving the prob-
lem of financial exclusion for both entrepreneurs and poor households efficiently by means of
standardized products and operations. However, our article also suggests that the actions that
hybrid organizations such as MFIs need to take to either cater to or deviate from specific exoge-
nous factors such as regulation may lead to mission drift (Grimes et al., 2020). In the case of Ital-
ian MFIs, a specialized microcredit regulation might have damaged the balance between MFIs’
financial and social objectives by stipulating, too rigorously, who the borrowers should be, what
the products should look like and how they should be delivered. According to our findings, the
political will of the Italian state regulator was not aligned with the MFIs’ original mission, and
this mismatch may have affected MFIs’ operational strategies. In this context, the role of Govern-
ment Microcredit Guarantee Schemes may be crucial to prevent the mission drift of MFIs and
enhance the potential of these organizations to support public services in tackling the structural
inequalities that create financial exclusion.
7 CONCLUSION
In this study we explored the perceptions of a group of Italian microfinance stakeholders on the
reasons for and the effects of microfinance-specific regulation in high-income welfare states. Our
paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of regulation for an effective microfinance
sector, in which MFIs, with a range of legal forms, should be able to achieve the balance between
social and financial performance and, thus, contribute to financial and social inclusion of vulner-
able groups in society.
Our findings reveal concerns from microfinance providers about the effects that the new laws
aiming for an effective sector have had in practice. Post-regulation institutional transformation of
most MFIs, in addition to legal restrictions in product design and target beneficiary groups, may
have shifted their balance in favor of financial performance over social objectives. Although our
findings depict the initial stages of the regulatory process investingMFIs and aremainly restricted
to a specific high-income context, they also suggest that providers of microfinance perceived that
the new regulation has been detrimental to the financial inclusion of vulnerable groups. This was
because the political will of the state regulator was not aligned with the original mission of the
microfinance sector.
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Future studies should pursue comparative mixed-method analyses of the rationales for a
microfinance-specific regulation in high-income contexts and the potential effects that specific
types of regulations can have on MFIs’ double bottom line. This is important to further under-
stand the role of MFIs in high-income welfare states and their potential to tackle the structural
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